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Abstract 
During a denial of service attack, it is difficult for a firewall to differentiate legitimate packets from rogue 
packets, particularly in large networks carrying substantial levels of traffic. Large networks commonly use 
network intrusion detection systems to identify such attacks, however new viruses and worms can escape 
detection until their signatures are known and classified as an attack. Commonly used IDS are rule based and 
static, and produce a high number of false positive alerts. The aim of this research was to determine if it is 
possible for a firewall to analyse its own traffic patterns to identify attempted denial of service. Statistical 
analyses of firewall logs for a large network were carried out and a baseline determined. Estimated traffic levels 
were projected using linear regression and Holt-Winter methods for comparison with the baseline. The research 
proposes a Neural Network model for forecasting rejected traffic falling outside the projected level for the 
network under study that could indicate an attack. The results of the research were positive with variance from 
the projected rejected packet levels successfully indicating an attack in the test network. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The expansion of networked systems in the past decade has led these networks into a security dilemma. On the 
one hand these networks try to protect networked resources from unauthorised external access and on the other 
keeping the network available on a 24x7 basis. While these goals seem to be reasonable, this is difficult to 
achieve, requiring substantial amount of design to produce a secure model for any network. Achieving such 
goals utilising the Internet is an even more complex and tedious process. Network administrators spend 
substantial time and effort trying to secure their networks from known and unknown threats resulting from the 
open nature of the Internet.   
The common idea behind any firewall is to allow legitimate entities to access shared networked resources based 
on predefined policies. The problem is that most firewalls do not know how to handle traffic unless it is 
predefined within the policy. In other words they lack the ability to learn from past experience and thus rely on 
human intervention. In most cases firewall administrators harden their firewalls by closing every port then 
setting rules to open certain ports as needed by the network users and applications.  
Hardening firewalls is effective in blocking illegal access to the network but cannot stop other sorts of network 
attacks by external and internal entities to the open ports. This is because they are considered legitimate 
activities by the firewall.  In some cases even the most hardened firewalls can fall into an attacker’s trap by 
responding to the attack packets rather than dropping them and continuing to process normal network activities. 
In the context of this paper this is a Denial of Service attack (DoS).  
In a practical networking environment, DoS can be defined in different ways depending upon the target (i.e. 
specific application or service): 
1. Attacks against application servers:  for example web servers, causing servers to be unavailable for 
public use. 
2. Flooding network gateways and firewalls: for example flooding with thousands or millions of 
Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP) packets causing either slowness in 
network activities or the network to become completely unusable till all packets are dropped from the 
network. 
3. Attacking mail gateways: for example sending mail ware Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 
packets that can block email systems for a long period of time before they can be cleared. 
This paper deals with DoS attacks of the second type, flooding the firewall with thousands of packets making it 
either unstable or unusable. Such a DoS attack will flood the network with randomly generated packets, where 
the firewall will respond by rejecting these packets if it has been configured properly, however, it will not serve 
the legitimate network users as it is busy rejecting these randomly arriving packets.  
Firewalls are good for filtering traffic, however, they need to be continually monitored and analysed in order to 
be more efficient against attacks (especially DoS attacks).  Early detection of an attack against the network aids 
fast elimination and more effective network protection. Firewall logs can collect, store and analyse firewall 
activity data to subsequently provide a proactive mechanism to defend the network from future attacks. The 
implementation of this can be complex where traffic levels on large networks are high, with some networks 
logging millions of packets every hour. It is not possible to eliminate DoS attacks completely, and protection 
against these attacks is expensive and time consuming. The most effective DoS defence approaches detect and 
block attack traffic close to the source, and this task is complex as it is difficult to discriminate between 
legitimate and malicious traffic (Peng et al. 2007). 
The aim of this paper is to describe research carried out using TCP/IP traffic data from a live network to produce 
an anomaly-based self-learning procedure for identification of DoS attacks. The general approach is to 
statistically develop a forecast of expected network traffic levels based upon a baseline derived from normal 
traffic on that network. This forecast is then compared to real-time activities to indicate possible DoS attacks.  
FIREWALLS AND IDS  
The primary role of any firewall is to protect the network based on pre-defined rules designed as per the 
computer network local security best practice policy (Smith & Bhattacharya 1999). The configuration of firewall 
rules is very important to differentiate between normal network activities and attacks. Some networks include 
additional protection systems on top of the firewall such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS).  
Activities logged by the firewall are very rich in data and can be analysed later to obtain further information 
about existing and future attacks. They can also be used to evaluate firewall security, performance and 
management levels (Noureldien & Osman 2000). The amount of security that can be provided by firewalls is 
limited when an attacker initiates an internal attack as this falls within the Local Area Network (LAN) 
boundaries. It is also limited in protecting against virus attacks due to the large number of software applications 
used within the network environment requiring special tools to be incorporated with the firewall to scan every 
packet.  
Even though current firewall systems can be implemented on a variety of software and hardware systems, the 
basic idea behind firewalls remains the same. Different types of firewalls can be found on routers or even on 
dedicated network servers. The first type of common firewall is the packet filter firewall which works by 
reading the source IP address from each packet header (Stallings 2006). Packet filtering firewalls filter incoming 
and outgoing packets and either allow or block the traffic, and if the packet is allowed to or from the network it 
will be forwarded to the next hub as per the routing table information for this packet’s destination. On the other 
hand, if the packet is blocked it will be discarded. Packet filtering firewalls are useless if an external attacker has 
spoofed the IP header with an internal IP address that the firewall will allow to get inside the network. In 
addition, packet-filtering firewalls fail to meet most of network application requirements.  
The second type of firewall is the application level firewall that allows network services (e.g. Telnet, FTP, etc.) 
to be established and used within predefined criteria controlled by firewall policies. However, even market 
leading firewalls such as Check Point Firewall-1 still lack a self-learning mechanism, in other words they cannot 
learn from past attacks dynamically (Noureldien & Osman 2000). Firewalls are designed by humans and need 
human intervention in order to be kept up-to-date with latest security patches and rules configuration.  
Firewalls can provide an authorized flow of traffic to inside the network and all traffic to pass to outside the 
network with a convenient service, direction, user and behaviour control, however, this type of protection is no 
longer a suitable type of protection when it comes to internal or external attacks, worms and viruses (Stallings 
2006). No complete immunity can be obtained using a firewall because it is a rule-based system. The problem 
has to occur before it can be identified and configured as a static rule in the firewall in order to be used for 
future filtration and protection.  
IDS are commonly used to supplement the firewall in identifying network attacks and the quicker the IDS can 
detect the attack the quicker an intrusion can be stopped before causing more potential damage to the network 
(Chang 2002). The most utilised type of IDS is misuse detection where firewall logs are compared with 
signatures of known attacks. Current misuse IDS models look for a matched pattern of information and activities 
that can be analysed and categorised as malicious behaviour by IDS to protect the network from intruders 
(Vigna et al. 2003). Misuse detection can efficiently detect known attacks if the signatures are known, resulting 
in a fast match with attack patterns stored in the IDS. Looking for patterns might is straightforward for an IDS 
which compares network traffic with attack data to pick intrusion patterns (Stolfo & Lee 2000). Misuse 
detection systems commonly exhibit low false positive rates, as an alarm is only raised if the log data possesses 
an attack signature. The main disadvantage of misuse detection IDS is that they cannot detect novel attacks that 
leave unknown signatures (Ghosh & Schwartzbard 1999). This means that a new type of DoS attack will go 
undetected by the misuse detection IDS until its signature is known and recorded. There is, therefore, a gap 
between the time the new attack appears and the time it is recognised as an attack by the coding of its signature 
in the IDS. This is one of the main limitations in the ability of misuse detection IDS to identify new attacking 
techniques without being attacked first. 
Ghosh and Schwatzbard (1999) categorise misuse detection approaches into expert systems, model-based 
reasoning, state transition analysis and keystroke dynamics monitoring. Although the misuse approach is a static 
process not able to identify and recognise novel attack mechanisms the majority of research into intrusion 
detection (and the commercial products available) are misuse based, requiring signature matching. 
The alternate approach to intrusion detection is anomaly based, which do not scan for identifiable patterns of 
attack, but performs analyses on past behaviour and build models of acceptable behaviour. This approach 
requires statistical analyses of previous network activity to determine a ‘normal’ range for comparison against 
current traffic. IDS can also make use of decision roles to decide, and neural networks (NN) and data mining 
theories have been used to enhance the performance of IDS systems against network attacks by providing an 
intelligent mechanism to learn more from past audit data collected from IDS (Lee & Heinbuch 2001).  Although 
extensive research has been carried out in misuse detection, research into pre-emptive approaches is less prolific. 
Categories of anomaly based research identified by Ghosh and Schwartzbard (1999) include rules for normal 
behaviour, statistical models of user or program profiles, and machine learning to recognise anomalous user or 
program behaviour. More recent research includes areas such as privileges flows and system calls (Cho & Park 
2003, Kruegel et al. 2003), specifically designed architectures (Bolzoni et al. 2006, Zanero 2008), web 
application profiles and protocols (Estevez-Tapiador et al. 2003, Kruegel & Vigna 2003, Robertson et al. 2006), 
data mining (Sequeira & Zaki 2002) and neural networks (Mukkamala et al. 2002, Ordonez-Cardenas & 
Romero-Troncoso 2008, Zhang, Jiang & Kamel 2005). Anomaly detection approaches require the establishment 
of a baseline derived from the normal behaviour of the network being monitored, which is then used as the basis 
for identifying deviations in order to detect potential DoS attacks. 
This paper focuses on network based IDS (NIDS) which dedicate a specific network device to act as a network 
activity monitor and sensor, and when a malicious activity is detected it alerts the network and blocks the 
intruders from doing further damage to the network participating hosts (Allan 2003). In spite of enhancements to 
expedite their ability to detect, alert and block intruders, traditional NIDS still suffer from re-configuration 
problems that make generalization and application to all network configurations difficult. This is due to protocol 
and configuration language dependencies while re-configuring classification methods in different NOS software 
and hardware environments (e.g. Cisco, UNIX and Windows) (Iheagwara & Blyth 2002, Ollmann 2003).  
EXPERIMENT IN SELF-LEARNING FIREWALL 
A common problem with IDS is the rate of inaccuracy and the high number of false positive alerts leading to 
management overheads without a valid source of an attack toward the network. This is due to the IDS using 
multiple algorithms when classifying an attack (Easley & Stiennon 2002). Chen et al. (2004) explain the 
limitations of three types of IDS in the handling DoS/DDoS attacks: 
1. Congestion based detection algorithm: can only be applied while the network is congested and can 
cause a lot of false positive alerts raised by normal network traffic at the time of the attack. 
2. Anomaly based detection algorithm: can only be applied to TCP SYNC packets and need to have a 
TCP protocol and sub-protocols (e.g. ICMP and UDP) thresholds to be known before it can declare a 
DoS attacks. This method can also generate false positives if the normal network traffic reaches the 
pre-defined thresholds. 
3. Source based detection algorithm: can be used surly if the source attacker utilise a spoofed IP address, 
however, if the system cannot distinguish between original trusted IP address and a spoofed IP it will 
generate a false alert.  
If a firewall were to analyse its own traffic logs and forecast traffic patterns for 24-48 hours it may be able to 
detect DoS as they occur, thus limiting the above disadvantages of current IDS. Such an approach is possible 
using data statistical modelling to produce a firewall pattern baseline from firewall logs without IDS coexistence 
in the network. Expected firewall traffic is then forecast based upon this baseline and actual traffic compared to 
the estimate. The expectation is that changes within the firewall traffic patterns can be interpreted as attacks as 
long as a minimum margin can be defined to eliminate false alerts. 
This research analysed a set of cross-sectional past data logs for a large networked environment comprised of 
15000+ systems incorporating hardware and software from different software vendors (see Figure 1 for the high 
level network configuration). This network was protected with a Check-Point Firewall-1, running on clustered 
UNIX platforms that serve multiple sites within the organisation. Both servers and hosts sitting behind the 
firewall represent a wide range of networked platforms (Microsoft Windows, Novell, UNIX and Linux). As 
with any large network the firewall configuration had been hardened to eliminate any possibility of network 
attacks to gain access behind the firewall, and hence the Check-Point Firewall-1 only logged activities of open 
ports as required by the applications used within the environment. In addition logging included the recording of 
dropped packets between LAN and WAN, these being classified as rejected packets.  
 
Figure 1 ─ Infrastructure of large computer network used in this research 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The data was collected in two stages. In stage one a number of cross-sectional statistical data samples were 
collected from existing network firewall logs representing live production network protocol activities on a daily 
basis for a period of three months. This data actually consisted of millions of readings per day and a Java routine 
was used to pre-prepare the data in 24 one-hour formats. This three month data set was used to develop the 
baseline model consisting of a total of 2184 observations (91 days x 24 observations per day) collected in the 
first stage. After developing the baseline model, another round of data was collected from logs from the same 
firewall network logs within a change controlled environment (i.e. no changes to the network firewall logging 
process occurred) over a further two months. This data was also prepared in 24 hour observations providing a 
total of 1416 observations (59 days x 24 observations per day). This second set of data was then compared with 
the baseline model forecasts for quantitative analysis. 
The collected data contained a variety of protocol activities such as TCP, IP, ICMP and UDP. These protocols 
represent the major parts of the standard TCP/IP suite of protocols required for Internet connections and 
communications to occur, therefore, the sampling of the data was designed based on a group of these protocols 
activities. The protocols were classified based on traffic direction (i.e. inbound traffic or outbound traffic) and 
packet status (i.e. packet been accepted or rejected).   
As the type of collected data was numeric, a quantitative approach for data analysis was deemed to be the most 
suitable to study the casual relationship between dependent factors within the designed baseline model.  Two 
quantitative statistical forecasting methods were used to produce the baseline model: Holt-Winter Multiplicative 
Smoothing Method and Linear Multiple Regression Method. The main reason for selecting these two methods 
was that both methods cover for trend and seasonality components at the same time. In addition Microsoft Excel 
was used to triangulate with MINITAB statistical software results to assure integrity for both forecasting 
methods. 
As the research explored the relationship between log patterns and DoS attack against network availability, the 
measurement unit selected was the total number of rejected packets per hour. The Holt-Winter method of 
forecasting uses an exponential smoothing forecasting technique that facilitates discovery of the underlying 
pattern within the time series data while eliminating the effects of any trend and seasonal components within the 
time series data.  
The linear regression model was selected as a forecasting tool to estimate the total number of rejected packets 
formulated as an equation of selected protocol packet activities and status (inbound or outbound through the 
firewall).  The aim of this statistical model was to see how closely the rejected packets matched the results found 
by the Holt-Winter forecasts in order to determine the reliability of results from both methods. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Due to the need to classify the packet status as either accepted or rejected, only inbound and outbound statistics 
were suitable for such a prediction of rejected packets over time. The regression model supports the above 
premise as it only used the inbound traffic protocols packets to predict the total number of rejected packets. 
Figures 2Aand 2B illustrate a common pattern appearing in the forecast residuals graphs for the Holt-Winter and 
the Linear Multiple Regression approaches. Figure 2A displays the actual inbound TCP traffic on the network 
under study over a two month period. Figure 2B plots the estimated rejected packet residuals using the linear 
regression and Holt-Winter forecasting methods. The light colour plots are linear regression residuals and the 
dark plots show the Holt-Winter residuals. The time periods in these figures are particularly significant, as 
discussed below. 
 
 
Figure 2A ─ Rejected Packets Residuals Using Regression and Holt-Winter Forecasting Models. 
  
Figure 2B ─ Inbound TCP Packets Traffic Pattern within the Baseline Data Set. 
 
Residuals Anomalies Analysis 
Figure 2B shows two spikes in the rejected packets residual pattern (both marked by a dashed line box). The 
large spike in the amount of packets occurred during Period 1 (i.e. 27th April to 1st May 2004) and investigating 
the firewall audit logs showed no explanation for this large spike in the residuals. A mix of an increase and a 
decrease in the packet levels appears within Period 2 (i.e. 17th May to 21st May 2004). When investigating 
firewall audit logs, it was found that the loss of data was due to the introduction of a new firewall cluster node 
that affected the logging process causing the loss of some logging data, and this was rectified on the final day of 
Period 2.  
After further investigating activities on the Internet over  Period “1” it was found that an Internet mail-ware 
worm named “SASSER” had spread during this period and only reported to the Internet community as early as 
the 1st May 2004 at 14:24 GMT time (SANS 2004). However, the SASSER had overwhelmed the network 
firewall for nearly four days before it was discovered. The SASSER mail-ware employs a vulnerability within 
the Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system called the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) 
that was discovered first in 26th April, 2004. However, the link between the LSASS vulnerability and SASSER 
was not made until the 30th April 2004. “SASSER” uses certain ports within TCP to spread itself (ports 445, 
5554 and 9996), and this corresponds to the inbound TCP packets received from the Internet over the WAN 
gateway (see Figure 2B).  
In this research, the case study network firewall was not based on a Microsoft Windows operating system and it 
blocked the SASSER packets requests from passing to the LAN network as these ports are not usually open. 
Therefore, the only effect of SASSER was limited to flooding the network with a large number of TCP packets 
passing through the gateway to the firewall interfaces and subsequently slowing down the whole network. This 
is a typical network DoS attack launched randomly from a SASSER infected Windows system targeting any 
network connected to the Internet. 
Identifying DoS Attack 
In order to declare a DoS attack based on the information provided by the residuals obtained from both 
forecasting baseline models (i.e. Holt-Winter and linear regression models), a maximum accepted margin of 
rejected packets per hour needs to be defined.  By using the real data (not forecasted data) the number of 
rejected packets from both inbound and outbound packets travelling across the firewall between January 1st and 
March 31st, 2004 could be calculated. This helped in obtaining the average number of rejected packets from the 
network (without having an attack) which was then compared with the average in the period from April 1st to 
May 29th, 2004 when the network is under attack. The difference is the maximum number of rejected packets 
that can be allowed before declaring a DoS attack. In order to obtain a percentage representation of the accuracy 
margin the total rejected packets per hour is divided by the total number of packets travelling in and out of the 
firewall per hour. Tables 1 and 2 show these calculations. 
 
 Inbound Traffic 
Outbound 
Traffic 
Rejected 
Traffic 
Average 
Number of 
Packets per 
Hour 
93748.41 342.12 51658.11 
Total 94090.53 51658.11 
Rejected  to 
Total Traffic 
Percentage 
54.9 % 
 
 Inbound Traffic 
Outbound 
Traffic 
Rejected 
Traffic 
Average 
Number of 
Packets per 
Hour 
108924.92 366.91 89888.85 
Total 109291.83 89888.85 
Rejected  to 
Total Traffic 
Percentage 
82.2 % 
Table 1 ─ Rejected Statistics (January-March 2004) 
 
Table 2 ─ Rejected Statistics (April-May 2004) 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the following: 
1. The amount of outbound traffic is very low, even negligible compared to the inbound traffic passing 
through the network at the same period. It appears that the inbound traffic influences the number of 
rejected packets more significantly than the outbound traffic.  
2. There is an increase of approximately 38,231 packets in the rejected packets per hour on average 
(89,888.85 – 51,658.11).  If the number of rejected packets per hour increases by 38,231 packets on 
this particular network it is highly likely that this network is under attack. 
Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the average percentage of rejected packets without attack is 54.9% and the average 
percentage of rejected packets with DoS attack is 82.2%. The percentage difference is 27.3% (82.2% - 54.9%). 
As an increase of 27.3% represent a threshold above the normal level of rejected packets could represent a DoS 
attack launched against the network, the trigger point for this network is 27.3% and any reading above this level 
should indicate a possible DoS attack. Hence the anomalies within the model residuals emphasise the 
relationship between DoS and daily network activities. In addition the regression baseline model can be re-
calculated every day and then a new forecast can be generated to compare 24-hour forecasts with real time data. 
However as each network environment is different, the trigger line for the network under study will not 
necessarily be the same for other networks, and a new trigger line needs to be established for each new network. 
A SIMPLE DETECTION MODEL BASED ON HISTORICAL DATA MINING 
The data collected earlier from 2004 as an example of a large attack shows that a statically calculated increase of 
27.3% was required to raise an alert. Therefore, finding the accurate threshold value before declaring an attack 
by comparing packets anomaly to normal network activity enhances the detection process. IDS and IPS can do 
this and provide an active response, however, it is very expensive and the majority of these products are 
proprietary (Thames et al. 2008). This research paper approached the problem with a solution from a network 
management point of view where the detection system can integrate with the firewall. This system can be tuned 
to use the firewall logs historical data at the beginning of the detection process and then recalculate the threshold 
dynamically without a predefined set of rules.  The detection process is based on the change of network 
activities using a neural network model to forecast the level of rejected packets within the network as compared 
with the threshold.  
Threshold Calculations 
Let’s assume the following: 
Firewall log history period = T (this could be day, week or month without an attack presented in the data) 
The average number of rejected packets per day using historical period T =Y 
The average number of rejected packets per day at period T + (1 day) = D 
Therefore, the baseline detection threshold H = (D/Y) – 1 and this must be > 0 to raise an alert 
 
The following example shows how to calculate the threshold: 
 
The historical data range T = 1 month 
The average number of rejected packets during the month of January: Y = 100000 Rejected Packets/Day 
The average number of rejected packets in the first day of February: D = 120000 Rejected Packets/Day 
Therefore, the baseline detection threshold: H = (120000/100000) – 1 = 0.2 = 20% 
 
The baseline detection threshold represents the network’s natural growth in rejected packets and anything higher 
than this threshold can be considered as an attack with the intention to flood the network with traffic that can 
lead to DoS.  Therefore, comparing the rejected packets forecast obtained from Multilayer Perceptron 
Backpropagation (MLP) with real rejected data for a specific day can show if the difference is lower or higher 
than the dynamically calculated threshold. In the above example if the difference between the two is higher than 
0.2 then an alert can be generated to protect the system either manually by the firewall administrator or 
automatically using the firewall rules itself.  
Multilayer Perceptron Backpropagation (MLP) Neural Network 
MLP is a type of neural network that can be constructed from an interconnected set of nodes with multiple 
layers as shown in Figure 3. The first layer is the input layer, the hidden layer where all inputs are transformed 
to the next layer based on their weights and the final layer is the output layer.   
 
Figure 3 ─ Neural Network Architecture Example with One Hidden Layer (Adapted from Kennedy et al. 1997) 
 
The MLP algorithm utilises the neural network inputs to calculate the output using a hyperbolic tangent 
transformation function for all hidden neurons (nodes). Therefore, the output neuron “y” is the sum of all the 
connection weights between the hidden neurons and the output neuron inside the network (Kennedy et al. 1997). 
Kennedy et al. (1997) defined the hyperbolic tangent transformation function to obtain the hidden neurons 
(nodes) output using the equation below: 
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Where the (net) in the previous equation is the output node (y) as a function of input nodes (x) that can be 
obtained from the summation of the weights multiplied by the inputs as per the following formula: 
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Where: 
• 0w  is the bias of the node  
• iw  is the connection weight from hidden neuron node thi  with input value ix  
For this research, MLP network inputs are the packets statics per a time unit (hour/day/week) for every type of 
packet that enters or exits the computer network firewall (e.g. TCP, IP, ICMP, UDP...etc) regardless as to 
whether it has an accepted or rejected status. The MLP neural network output represents the total number of 
rejected packets forecast for the next time period (hour/day/week).   
Figure 4 shows the flow of data within MLP with recursive backpropagation processing of the weights that is 
used to find the optimal value of the connection weights between MLP input and output nodes (Ordonez-
Cardenas & Romero-Troncoso 2008). The scaling process is a pre-processing step to prepare the inputs in order 
to match the hyperbolic tangent range. 
 
Figure 4 ─ MLP System Floorplan (Adapted from Ordoez-Cardenas & Romero-Troncoso 2008) 
 
The error minimisation can be obtained by backpropagating the difference between real training output values 
and predicted output values of the MLP using Mean Square Error (MSE) of the overall training set with the 
following MSE error equation: 
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Where: 
 
• E  is the total root mean square error of the network at training pattern “ i ” 
• i  is the index of the training pattern input value 
• trainN  is the total number of training patterns with total number of outputs “ J ” 
• j  is the index of the training pattern output value 
• J  is the training patterns outputs 
• ijd  is the desired value of output “ j ” at training pattern “ i ” 
• ijy  is the actual output of the training pattern    
The Attack Detection Process 
This research approaches the solution of the problem from a network management point of view. Instead of 
setting the threshold to raise an alert by configuration rules, the model will re-calculate the threshold based on 
the history of average rejected packets as recorded by the firewall logs. The proposed solution model is different 
from existing IDS/IPS in that it can change the detection rule dynamically using the following process: 
• Analyse firewall logs and obtain protocol statistics 
• Calculate the baseline natural growth threshold of rejected packets over the past available log history  
• Forecast future levels of rejected packets  
• Compare forecasted data with real data within units of hours or days. 
• If the difference between real data and forecasted data exceed the threshold then raise appropriate 
alerts. 
• Recalculate the detection threshold and compare with baseline threshold. 
• Repeat previous steps if a major re-configuration occur to the firewall network to obtain the new 
baseline threshold. 
CONCLUSION 
This research paper has shown that we can predict the network firewall activities ahead of time using forecasting 
techniques such as Holt-Winter or Linear Regression. The anomalies described in the previous sections show a 
solid relationship between the patterns obtained from past logs data and future forecasted data by investigating 
the difference (i.e. residuals), and the DoS pattern represents as an anomaly. However, as different networks 
operate under different levels of inbound data traffic per hour, the maximum allowed average of rejected packet 
counts needs to be determined in a percentage format in order to apply to other network environments. 
The proposed model involving analysis of past data with MLP can be considered a simple IDS or IPS system 
based on quantitative analysis rather than the IDS / IPS rule based systems. The ability to forecast even one hour 
ahead would give the system administrator the capability of deciding if they should stop certain activities on the 
network before it is too late. Alternatively more automated responses could be implemented. Further research is 
needed to confirm these findings in different networks and enhance self learning techniques by applying neural 
network modelling in order to produce more practical, self manageable and reliable results when compared with 
other IDS and IPS network security protection techniques.  
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